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DISQUALIFICATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
PAUL H. SANDERS*
A. BASIC STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE IN DISQUALIFICATION
Our public arrangements in this country for compensating unem-
ployment (including the aggregate of federal and state legislation to
that end) are quite properly referred to as an "insurance" program.'
Study of the elements of coverage in an insurance policy will be found
instructive, therefore, in the matter of eligibility and disqualification
for unemployment benefits.
A contract of insurance is designed to transfer certain defined risks
from the insured to the insurer.2 The risks selected for this process in a
particular policy will be described or stated affirmatively in its provi-
sions.3 Certain exclusions from the risk may be specified for even
greater precision in delineating the boundaries of the insured event 4-
thus the process of inclusion and exclusion establishes the affirmative
conditions of the insurer's liability and defines the insured event or,
more precisely, the event insured against.5 Risks must be selected and
defined to provide the subject matter for the operation of the agreement
between the parties. In addition, the insurer will probably insert pro-
visions designed to control or minimize the risk assumed.6 This may
be accomplished by (1) stating exceptions to, or suspensions of, its
liability when the event (of the type insured) is due to certain
specified causes and (2) by establishing (perhaps through continuing
warranties exacted from the insured) negative conditions of its
promise under which the insurer will be relieved of the obligation to
pay even though there is in fact no causal connection between the
broken condition and the insured event.7 Through these control meas-
ures the insurer will be seeking to avoid the assumption of certain
moral hazards related particularly to the insured's wilful causing of
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Special Faculty Editor of this
Symposium; formerly Regional Attorney, United States Department of Labor.
Acknowledgment is made of the major assistance of Doris Dudney and
Thomas Trimble, members of the student staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review,
in the research and writing for the sections on Voluntary Leaving and Refusal
of Suitable Wdrk, respectively.
1. See U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON
OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS passim (1949); VANCE, INSURANCE,
53 (3d ed. 1951).
2. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 199 (1935); and VANCE, INSUR-
ANCE 82 (3d ed. 1951).
3. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 200 (1935).
4. Id. at 213.
5. Id. at 204.
6. Id. at 200.
7. Id. at 202; see VANCE, INSURANCE 408-12 (3d ed. 1951).
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the insured event8 and to exert pressure upon the insured to decrease
the risk (or at least keep it from increasing).9 Through these excep-
tions and conditions the legitimate objective of reducing the scope of
coverage to manageable proportions can be achieved. The imposition
of a forfeiture upon the insured through such techniques is neither a
legitimate purp6se nor result.10
Quite apart from specific provisions setting forth excepted causes of
the insured event, 1 it is important to note that in any event the law of
insurance will except some causes of the insured event by implica-
tion. 12 It is assumed that an insurance enterprise cannot function as
such if the carrier is to be held liable for losses designedly caused by
the persons insured-that such a situation is in basic conflict with the
aleatory nature of insurance.' 3 "[It] is implied in every insurance con-
tract that the insured event is a fortuitous one, i.e. one not designedly
brought about by the insured.'
14
This sketch of certain structural aspects of the selection and control
of an insurance risk has its rather obvious parallels in the eligibility
and disqualification provisions of a state unemployment insurance act.
Not all risks in connection with unemployment are to be covered.15
The program does not contemplate a welfare-type grant to every un-
employed person. Eligibility conditions represent the affirmative state-
ment of the risks selected for coverage under the program.16 In terms
of conditions precedent the risk which the program insures against
(the insured event) is the unemployment beyond the waiting period
of a claimant who has established himself as part of a labor force (hav-
ing earned qualifying wages in covered employment) and who has a
continuing attachment to it (being able to work and available for
work), signified by registration for work at an employment office.
In contrast with eligibility, disqualification provisions in unemploy-
ment insurance laws, while recognizable as in the nature of negative
conditions or conditions subsequent, do not lend themselves quite so
simply to analysis and classification."' Still, all four of the major dis-
8. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 200 (1935).
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 220; see VANCE, INSURANCE 421-23 (3d ed. 1951).
11. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 212-13 (1935).
12. Id. at 221; VANCE, INSURANCE 90 (3d ed. 1951).
13. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 221 (1935); VANCE, INSTJRANCE
93 (3d ed. 1951); see "aleatory contract" in BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d cd.
1933). This principle is not applicable to the negligence of the insured, VANCE,
supra at 91-2; PATTERSON, CASES ON INSURANCE 221 (3d ed. 1955).
14. PATTERSON. ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 221 (1935).
15. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 519 (1937). See
RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 466 (1950); Burns,
The Relation of Unemployment Compensation to the Broader Problem of
Relief, 3 LAW & COMTEMP. PROB. 20, 22 (1936).
16. See WILLIAMS, ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, supra at p. 286
and COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra
note 1,
17. See COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 66-89 for tabular presentation and analysis of disqualification pro-
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qualifying provisions may be characterized rather readily as efforts to
limit and control the risk by setting forth exceptions to it: i.e., by es-
tablishing excepted causes of the otherwise insured event (the unem-
ployment of an eligible worker). Disqualifications based on (a) leaving
work yoluntarily without good cause,'3 (b) discharge for misconduct
connected with the work,19 (c) refusal of suitable work2 and (d) un-
employment due to a labor dispute2'-all represent limitations on cover-
age by means of the excepted cause.2 2 None of these refers expressly to
the designed bringing about of the insured event by the insured (the
seeking of compensated unemployment). The first three named may be
recognized, however, as controls directed toward this hazard and
hedging in an area around it sufficiently related to it in terms of
probability to support the judgment that payment of compensation is
visions in all states. See, under the general heading of "Eligibility and Dis-
qualification for Benefits": Harrison, Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Un-
employment," 55 YALE L.J. 117 (1945); Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55
YALE L.J. 134 (1945); Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and
Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147 (1945); Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 167 (1945); Simrell, Employer Fault vs.
General Welfare as the Basis for Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J.
181 (1945); see also Teple, Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct and Vol-
untary Quit, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 191 (1949); SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BUREAU
MEMORANDUM No. 32, Part I, Principles Underlying Disqualification for Bene-
fits in Unemployment Compensation (1938).
18. See Part B of this article, infra. All states have such a disqualification
provision. See Table 24 in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAWS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 70. As of 1949 the general "good cause" pro-
vision included good personal cause in thirty-three states. Other states had
provisions more or less specific in requiring the cause to be connected with the
work or attributable to the employer. Id. at 68-69. The permissible period of
disqualification under this heading as of 1949 ranged from the week of separa-
tion plus one week to the duration of the unemployment or more. Id. at 70-71.
Cancellation of benefit rights for varying periods was established in 17 states in
1949, id. at 71, but that figure has increased since. See, e.g., the 1955 change in
the Tennessee Employment Security Law (Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 115 § 7)
amending Subsection A of § 6901.5 of the Code Supplement of 1950 providing
for the deduction of benefit credits equal to the period of disqualification.
19. See Part D of this article. infra. All states have such a disqualification.
See table 25 (p. 72). and the summary on p. 74 of COMPARISON OF STATE UN-
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, OP. cit. supra note 1. Most of the states have a
variable period here to be applied "according to the seriousness of the mis-
conduct" and a number have specified heavier disqualification provision for
aggravated or gross misconduct. Id. at 73. The period of disqualification again
runs from one week to the duration of unemployment (and longer) and for
cancellation of benefit rights to the extent of a complete cancellation. Id. at 72.
See TENN. CODE SUPP. § 6901.5 B (1) (1950). Tennessee joined the group
of states cancelling benefit credits on an equivalent basis to weeks of disquali-
fication at the 1955 legislative session. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 115 § 8.
20. See Part C of this article, infra. All states have such a provision. See
Table 26 and summary, pp. 76-77, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE, Op. cit. supra note 1. There is much of the same variation in disquali-
fying period and reduction of benefit rights as was indicated for voluntary
quit and misconduct discharge disqualifications in notes 18 and 19.
21. See Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some
Problems, infra p. 338, and Table 27 in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE LAWS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 78.
22. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BUREAU MEMORANDUM No. 32, Part I,
Principles Underlying Disqualifications for Benefits in Unemployment Com-
pensation, pp. 1-2 (1938) ; cf. Kempfer, supra note 17, at 149-51, and PATTERSON,
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 212 (1935).
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politically and, perhaps economically, undesirable. In each instance
the unemployment is presumably brought about or continued by
activity reasonably attributable to the volition of the insured worker
(by behavior over which he has control). In the case of disqualifying
misconduct unemployment is foreseeable as a consequence of such be-
havior.
These three provisions are in sharp contrast with the labor dispute
disqualification in this respect as well as in basic purpose. A labor
dispute of the prescribed type is excepted as a cause of insured unem-
ployment insofar as employees in the same grade or class are con-
cerned, without regard to their intentions, desires or actions.3
Participation in the labor dispute causing the unemployment will
broaden the exception, however, and disqualify without regard to
grade or class.24 The control of the risk under this disqualification is
obviously not so much concerned with protecting against the moral
hazard that the insured will designedly produce the insured event
(although here, too, there will be elements of voluntariness at times).
The disqualifying event, assuming full participation, is under appro-
priate circumstances recognized as a basic right and accorded exten-
sive legal protection otherwise. The disqualification may be regarded
as being founded on a policy of maintaining in labor disputes neu-
trality with respect to the insurance fund.2
Reverting to our principal concern in this paper, the voluntary quit,
discharge for misconduct and refusal of suitable work trio of disquali-
fications, we can observe that the whole realm of voluntary action is
not covered under any of the headings. There can be a leaving of
work for good cause; there can be a discharge for a worker's conduct
other than misconduct connected with the work; there can be a refusal
of unsuitable work-all instances, in some senses at least, of behavior
within the control of the claimant contributing as a cause of unem-
ployment, and yet all without disqualification. It may be noted, how-
ever, that in each of these situations the degree of likelihood of masked
"malingering 26 or of covert design to bring on the insured event is
undoubtedly less than in those stated to be disqualifying. There are
obviously factors operative here other than the mere existence of a
causal connection between the worker's conduct and a period of un-
employment. To the extent that there is a disqualification under these
provisions it is believed that the causal connection should be of basic
importance. If it is not there, in these three instances, we have gone
23. See, e.g., TENN. CODE Supp. § 6901.5 D (2) (1950) and substantially similar
language in all other state statutes.
24. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 6901.5 D(1) (1950).
25. See Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some
Problems, infra 338.
26. See Huntington, The Benefit Provisions of State Unemployment Insur-
ance Laws, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 20, 22 (1936).
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beyond any reasonable function or purpose of disqualification designed
to keep a risk under control by excepting a cause. But the causal
connection is not enough; the reasonableness of the conduct of the
worker under the circumstances is a factor to be looked into at the
same time. There are other social, political and economic values to be
considered along with those which weigh against compensation from
a limited fund to persons who have in some degree brought on their
unemployment.
Our fre5' enterprise system includes among its fundamentals the
mobility of labor.27 Involuntary servitude is forbidden by the Con-
stitution.28 Freedom to leave or refuse a job for any or no reason, to
take chances on a new enterprise or job, nearby or far away, would
usually be considered a part of the American Way.29 There is the
troublesome problem also of what is the cause of the continued un-
employment of a person who has signified at a public employment
office that he now desires employment rather than unemployment.
Our three disqualification provisions, recognizing a considerable
variation in the different states, represent resolution of 'these
questions and conflicting values. In general, and certainly if
original language and purposes had been adhered to, the freedom of
action of the employee, even though it resulted in unemployment, was
not to disqualify if his conduct was reasonable under the circum-
stances.30 It would appear that the standards of reasonableness would
necessarily be personal as disqualification itself is personal. A reason-
able person desiring employment rather than unemployment, standing
in the shoes of the claimant at the time-how would he have acted?
Furthermore, even though the conduct bringing on or continuing the
unemployment was found disqualifying, this determination in the
beginning operated merely to suspend the possibility of compensation
for a limited number of weeks-a legislative solution, arbitrary in
character, for the problem of separating the contributing causes to the
continuing unemployment of an eligible claimant.
Three of our four disqualifications are not only controlling the risk
assumed by the unemployment insurance program by providing excep-
tions to it; the voluntary quit, misconduct discharge and work refusal
trio can also be considered as negative conditions of compensation de-
signed to exert pressure within the limits indicated in the preceding
paragraph upon the insured to decrease the risk or keep it from in-
creasing. This is most obviously true in the refusal of suitable work
27. See Harrison, supra note 17 at 122.
28. U.S. CoNsT., Amend. XIII.
29. See SHEFFERMAN, LABOR'S STAKE IN CAPITALISM, passim; "Job shifting
for each person is possible within the framework of our traditional system."
Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc. News Release No. E-305-306,
p. 3 ("Spotlight").
30. See SoCAL SEcuITY BOARD, BuREAu MEMORANDUM No. 32, Part I, supra
note 22 at 84-87.
1955 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
disqualification. Failure when directed to apply for available, suitable
work or to return to customary self-employment are also usually in-
cluded in the same provision and declared to be disqualifying. Pres-
sure on the worker to minimize the risk is indicated in each of these
situations. Each carries a relatively high degree of probability of self-
induced unempl6yment. When these conditions are classified as con-
trols in the nature of penalties designed to exert pressure on the
insured to avoid the occurrence of the insured event rather than ex-
cepted causes, it can be seen that the central hazard being guarded
against is still the designed seeking of compensated unemployment.
Other typical disqualifications preclude compensation where there is
no wage loss or when there is double recovery of benefits or fraud on
the unemployment insurance system attempting or accomplished. 31
To establish such situations as conditions eliminating an obligation to
pay benefits for stated periods is quite consistent with the idea of
reasonable controls for protection of the system and the preserving
of it for the performance of its needed function in compensating legiti-
mate claims. Disqualification for misrepresentation and fraud does
not require any relationship between the disqualifying event and the
unemployment. It is more than pressure, it involves an admitted
penalty (a forfeiture) and is therefore different in character from
measures designed to define, control or minimize the risk that the
insured event will occur. Fraudulent claims are obviously subversive
of the whole unemployment insurance program. A penalty for such
conduct will undoubtedly act as a measure of control and minimization
over the aggregate of claims regardless of its effect on the unemploy-
ment of the claimant in the particular instance. The fraudulent claim
disqualification was a late comer in the unemployment insurance pro-
gram and was not embodied in the "model bill" of the Federal Bureau
of Employment Security until 1950.32 The reason must have been the
assumption that our trio of disqualifications were designed to sur-
round and contain this problem.
The foregoing discussion has indicated that the general structure of
disqualification in the unemployment insurance statutes bears a readily
recognized relationship to accepted insurance principles applicable to
defining, controlling and minimizing the risk assumed by the program.
It has been indicated also that in the normal statement of the volun-
tary quit, misconduct discharge, and work refusal trio of disqualifica-
tions a balance has been struck between these legitimate controls of
the risk and the values that inhere in mobility of labor and freedom
of choice. The detailed treatment of these three disqualifications
31. See Tables 29-31, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS,
op. cit, supra note 1, at 84-88.
32. See U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, MANUAL OF
STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION 35 and C-62-C-64 (rev. Sept. 1950).
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in this paper will throw light on the extent to which this under-
lying purpose and balance has been maintained.
The principles applicable to control of the risk do not, normally, per-
mit the operation of anything that can be classified as a penalty or
forfeiture, as such.33 Insurance company practices which tended in this
direction have properly been condemned and brought under control by
legislation and court decision.34 It has already been indicated that the
fraudulent claim disqualification is an obvious penalty, but one rea-
sonably related to controlling the aggregate of risk borne by- the un-
employment insurance program and to the protection and preservation
of that program. There are other developments in disqualification,
however, which seem to be penalizing rather than risk-controlling in
their purpose, and which seem to bear no reasonable relationship to
the preservation and proper functioning of an unemployment insur-
ance program.
The idea of disqualification as a penalty is at time stated expressly
in such terms in the statute. This is true for example, in the "voluntary
quit" section of the Tennessee statute.3 5 This is unfortunate, of course,
because it carries with it the connotation that the employee who quits
his job without good cause connected with the work is somehow or
or other engaging in wrongful conduct rather than merely bringing
about a situation where it is not reasonable to allow him to participate
in a limited fund. The major problem is not one of terminology, how-
ever. Many of the more disturbing developments in this connection
will make no reference to "penalty" at all. The increasing number of
provisions which not only disqualify in the sense of postpone,
but which provide for forfeiture of benefit credits, are good examples.36
The voluntary quit and discharge for ordinary misconduct sections of
the Tennessee statute have just been amended to provide for the
deduction from the maximum benefit amount an amount equal to the
number of weeks of disqualification multiplied by the weekly benefit
amount.37 Such provisions are apparently being added in more and
more states. What reasonable relationship do they bear to a control
over the hazard of self-induced unemployment properly balanced with
freedom of job movement? It seems obvious that other controls and
other objectives are being sought here, outside of and rather foreign to
a program which would center its attention on providing for the un-
employed person who wants employment rather than compensated
unemployment. If these increasing strictures in the disqualification
aspects of unemployment legislation are examined closely, they appear
33. Supra, p. 308.
34. VANCE, INsuRANcE 417, 419-22, 426 (3d ed. 1951); see PATTERSON, Es-
SENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 200, 220-21 (1935).
35. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 6901.5 A (1950).
36. See references in notes 18-20, supra.
37. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 115 §§ 7 and 8.
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to be more and more controls and pressures designed to regulate
employer-employee relations on the one hand and to minimize an
employer's unfavorable experience (with consequent effect on con-
tributions) on the other. It can scarcely be denied that the first of
these objectives has no place, as such, in an employment insurance
program.38 Further, if the second becomes dominant rather than con-
sequential, either in legislative or judicial approach, we will run the
risk of a self-defeating program by reason of internal inconsistency
and the physical as well as legal impossibility of pursuing a set of
values and interests that are more or less frequently in conflict.
Controls directed toward employer-employee relations rather than
the risk of unemployment seem to get into the picture as soon as ifhe
disqualification period extends beyond the few weeks that will test
whether the claimant's voluntary action in precipitating his unemploy-
ment or general economic conditions in the labor market are causing
his continued lack of work when he is able and available for work.
When the disqualification period extends for the duration of the un-
Employment and beyond, this becomes even clearer. The added can-
cellation of benefit rights goes still further in penalizing through the
imposition of a forfeiture. The sliding-scale disqualification, determined
by the circumstances of employee conduct, is apt to center on regulat-
ing the conduct rather than its relationship to the risk of unemploy-
ment. The complete cancellation of benefit rights, such as in the
Tennessee gross-misconduct disqualification affords an excellent
illustration of the back-handed attempt to regulate something outside
of the principal business of unemployment insurance.39
Of course it can be said that these penalizing provisions are exerting
pressure on the employee to avoid behavior which will bring on or
continue unemployment and therefore utilize a well-established pat-
tern in insurance for minimizing the risk. Employee conduct in pre-
cipitating termination of employment can certainly have an effect on
re-employment opportunities at times. It is because the extreme
measures overreach and go far beyond what is needed for reasonable
risk control alone, however, that they may be criticized as being out of
place in the program. Their penalizing effect will be such, in fact, only
if labor market conditions are adverse in terms of hiring in the great
majority of instances. This means that the penalty will fall with un-
even effect upon persons engaging in substantially identical conduct
and for reasons unrelated to that conduct. If we are going to get into
a regulation of the details of employer-employee relations, we will
want to do it consciously and with due consideration for all the many
factors and legal patterns that will bear on the subject. We certainly
will not desire to "back into" such a regulation through the unemploy-
38. See Harrison, supra note 17 at 122.
39. TENN. CODE SuPP. § 6901.5 B(1). (1950).
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ment insurance program. There is always the matter, too, of maintain-
ing a proper balance with the values associated with free job move-
ment. The interest of our economy as a whole and the interest of a
particular employer in the conduct and stability of his employees are
not necessarily the same. The interests may in fact conflict. It is as-
sumed that all would agree that our legislative enactments and our
judicial interpretation should seek to advance the broader public
interest.
The public policy provision of the Tennessee Employment Security
Law40 states that "involuntary unemployment" is a subject of general
concern and concludes with the declaration that the public good re-
quires the setting aside of unemployment reserves for those "unem-
ployed through no fault of their own." These same words and phrases
(taken from the original "draft bill" offered to the states by the Social
Security Board) 41 were inserted in the policy declarations of many
state laws. It has been assumed that the primary purpose of such
language was to aid in surmounting tests of constitutionality, although
considered of questionable value in that connection.42 The influence of
the words in leading the courts to a restrictive interpretation of the
various state laws resulted in their being dropped from subsequent
"draft bills" and the same author labeling them as "deplored
phrases.
' 43
Another authority has said that:
"The basic idea which underlies the conditions of eligibility and
grounds for disqualification ... is that not all unemployment should be
compensable but the burden of the system should be circumscribed by
certain limiting policies which often glibly and superficially are gen-
eralized as restrictions to involuntary employment." (emphasis in
original) 44
While one may be in complete sympathy with those who are thoroughly
dissatisfied with what some courts have done in the name of freedom
of the will and allocation of fault, it is submitted that we will not
better the situation by banishing the term or the idea of voluntary
unemployment beyond .the pale of the employment security program.
Learning to live with the term as well as the disqualifying effect of
"9voluntary unemployment" is advisable in the first place because the
idea is obviously central in the voluntary quit, misconduct discharge
and work refusal disqualifications. Each of these disqualifications
has at its core the protection against the hazard of self-induced un-
employment. In the next place, as we have seen, the basic principles
of insurance are thought to require the exception of the designed
40. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 6901.1 (1950).
41. See Harrison, supra note 17 at 118.
42. Id. at 119.
43. Ibid.
44. RIESENFELD AND MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 550-51 (1950).
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bringing about of the insured event by the insured himself. This will
normally result in an implied exception from coverage in this type
of voluntary action no matter what words are used or omitted. There
is no reason to believe, therefore, that a substantially different result
would have been achieved in a particular state by reason of the
presence or absence in the statute of a general reference to "involun-
tary unemployment." 45 The problem seems to be one of giving this
phrase its proper restriction and orientation rather than of dismissing
it.
"Fault" on the other hand seems to be properly deserving of the
"deplored" label. It confuses the issue and blurs basic purposes when
applied to an evaluation of the behavior of a claimant in precipitating
or continuing his unemployment. Obviously, the labor dispute dis-
qualification is not operative by reason of any assumed fault on the
part of the claimant out of work as a result of such dispute, whether he
is participating actively in it or not. The employee who quits his job
to take an extended vacation or for any of many other reasons which
would not be treated as "good cause connected with his work" would
not be at "fault" in the usual meaning of the word. The same is true
when the claimant turns down work which would normally be con-
sidered suitable for him. Yet all of these are disqualifying situations
under provisions which have been regarded as reasonably related to
the defining and controlling the risk assumed by the program, bearing
in mind its central purpose and the politically and economically feasi-
ble uses of a limited fund.
If we are dominated by a "fault" allocation idea we can expect it
to condition the interpretation of language such as "left work volun-
tarily without good cause" or "failed, without good cause, to accept
suitable work" to reach results not required by and perhaps contrary
to plain language. We have observed that the basic principles of in-
surance necessarily require the exception from coverage of the de-
signed causing of the insured event by the insured. Yet this implica-
tion does not extend to the barring of coverage where the negligence
of the insured is the cause of the event.46 In ordinary meaning, how-
ever, "negligence" is subsumed in the idea of "fault." So we have
further opportunity for the word to becloud the issue. Most obfuscat-
ing of all, however, there has developed and is continuing to develop,
through statutory phrasing and judicial pronouncement, the idea that
"employer fault" should be found as a basis of relieving the claimant
of disqualifications. This in turn leads to such absurdity as the attrib-
uting of "fault" to the woman employee who leaves a job to get
married or to join her husband or to have a baby, because of the
45. See Harrison, supra note 17 at 121.
46. Infra, p. 334
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absence of "blame" for these situations on the part of the employer.
47
While this desire can find expression and fulfillment through non-
charging provisions applicable to the employer's experience and
contribution rate,4 8 it has undoubtedly had great influence on the in-
terpretation and administration of the disqualification provisions
themselves.
We can conclude this general discussion 'by observing that the volun-
tary quit, misconduct discharge, and work refusal trio of disqualifica-
tions serve the purpose of imposing a reasonable control overthe risk
assumed by the unemployment insurance program by excepting
unemployment so caused. More specifically, these disqualifications
must be conceded as primarily designed to protect against the hazard
of self-induced compensable unemployment (the seeking of the
insured event). Further, that hazard is hedged about by precluding
(or suspending) payment for such other unemployment as was caused
or continued by behavior within the control of the claimant which he
was reasonably free to avoid. This penumbra is sufficient to take care
of doubtful as well as clear cases under the central disqualifying
policy. If courts can be persuaded to keep their attention centered on
the designed or wilful bringing about of compensated unemployment
as the primary target of these disqualifications, and therefore the
denotation and much of the connotation of "voluntary unemployment,"
there would be no reason why this phrase could not serve a useful
function in the further development of the law. Such a centering
would condition the interpretation and application of these disqualifi-
cations to so much other precipitating or continuing of unemployment
as approaches the core idea, because reasonably avoidable and a
reasonable person in claimant's shoes would have avoided it if moti-
vated by a desire for employment rather than unemployment. This
restriction and orientation in thought coupled with the elimination of
"fault" in the bringing on of the unemployment as an independent con-
cept in the interpretation of the disqualification provisions should
permit us to do more efficiently the job that unemployment insurance
program was designed to accomplish.
B. VOLUNTARY LEAVING OF WORK*
Although "voluntary leaving" literally means giving up work of
one's own volition or will, the scope of the phrase has been extended
to include voluntary action indicating an intention to terminate em-
47. See Simrell, supra note 17 at 181-204.
48. See Teple & Norwacek, Experience Rating: It's 'Objections, Problems and
Economic Implications, infra p. 376.
* Doris Dudney, a member of the student staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review




ployment, notwithstanding that the immediate cause of separation
was discharge or replacement. Thus, voluntary commission of an act
with knowledge that discharge will follow has been found to be a
voluntary leaving,49 as well as voluntary assumption of a position
which requires continued absence from work and results in replace-
ment.50 Where employees' continued refusal to work on certain days
caused their employer to close his business on those days, the unem-
ployment was termed voluntary;5 ' but when employees rejected a
reduced wage scale offered as an alternative to a shut-down, lack of
work was said to be the real cause of the unemployment.5 2
The difficulty of finding an intention on the part of an individual
claimant has produced conflicting results in cases where the claimant's
separation from work was occasioned by the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement. Some courts have looked to the character of
the action which the claimant has taken in conformity with the terms
of the agreement and have attempted to judge his willingness with
respect to that end. Compensation was denied to employees who re-
mained away from work to observe a "memorial period" designated
by their union's president pursuant to the terms of a bargaining agree-
ment.5 3 A claimant who was forced to accept a pension under a
compulsory retirement plan was found to be entitled to compensa-
tion,5 4 but a claimant who chose a pension under an optional plan was
said to have left work voluntarily without good cause.
5 5
On the other hand, in cases where agreements required that certain
classes of employees be given vacations with pay, and the business was
closed for a vacation period, compensation has been denied to em-
ployees not entitled to vacation pay on the ground that they agreed to
49. See Standard Oil v. Review Bd. of Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 119 Ind. App.
576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949); Olechnicky v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 325
Mass. 660, 92 N.E.2d 252 (1950); O'Donnell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 173 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d 406 (1953); 6 INTRA. L. REV. 162 (1950).
But cf. MacFarland v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super. 418,
45 A.2d 423 (1946).
50. See Vernon v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 131,
63 A.2d 383 (1949); Michalsky v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 163 Pa.
Super. 436, 62 A.2d 113 (1948).
51. See Mehlbaum v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 175 Pa. Super.. 497,
107 A.2d 141 (1954).
52. See Copper Range Co. v. Michigan Unempl. Comp. Comm'n, 320 Mich.
460, 31 N.W.2d 692 (1948).
53. See Bedwell v. Review Bd. of Indiana Empl. Sec. Div., 119 Ind. App.
607, 88 N.E.2d 916 (1949).
54. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Rev., 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953),
67 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1954), reversing Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Rev.,
24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A 2d 514, 28 N.Y U.L.Q. REV. 1332 (1953).
55. See Krauss v. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1933),
reversing, 24 N.J. Super. 277, 94 A.2d 339 (1953). Cf. Celanese Corp. of
America v. Bartlett, 90 A.2d 208 (Md. 1952). Generally, compensation is denied
after retirement with a pension on one of two grounds: (1) that a pension
is "payment of wages" or "remuneration" and the claimant is thus not unem-
ployed under the applicable statutory definition; or (2) that retirement indi-
cates a withdrawal from the labor force, which renders the claimant ineligible
because unavailable. See Note, 32 A.L.R.2d 901 (1953).
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a temporary unemployment through their bargaining agent. In earlier
cases this view was taken without examining the terms of the agree-
ments, 55 and was rejected in later cases, where the terms of the agree-
ment did not require the closing of the business, 57 where the agree-
ment contemplated that ineligible employees would be given work
during the vacation period,5 8 -and where the closing of business was
not primarily for the purpose of providing vacations.59 Recently it
has been held that where an agreement stipulates one vacation period
for all eligible employees, those not eligible are not voluntarily
unemployed during the vacation shut-down.60 Statutes enacted as a
result of these decisions take divergent views. One type provides that
in no case will a collective bargaining agreement requiring vacations
with pay render unemployment voluntary as to those employees not
entitled to vacations.6 ' Another provides that the unemployment may
be considered voluntary only when the terms of the agreement require
a shut-down.62 Consent is deemed to exist when the shut-down is at the
56. See Moen v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 324 Mass. 246, 85 N.E.2d 779
(1949) (rule changed by statute); Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951), 36 MIxN. L. REv. 426 (1952);
Mattey v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A.2d 429
(1949) ; In re Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 Wash.2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948),
2 OxLA. L. REv. 389 (1949), 25 WASH. L. REV. 99 (1950) (rule changed by
statute). Those employees entitled to vacation pay are generally held not
unemployed because "remuneration" or "wages" are payable during the
vacation period, even though the employees refuse to accept them. See
American Central Mfg. Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 119 Ind.
App. 430, 88 N.E.2d 256 (1949); Note, 30 A.L.R.2d 366 (1943).
57. See Schettino v. Administrator, Unempl. Comp. Act, 138 Conn. 253, 83
A.2d 217 (1951); American Bridge Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.,
121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951); Hubbard v. Michigan Unempl. Comp.
Comm'n, 328 Mich. 444, 44 N.W.2d 4 (1950) (union expressly refused proposed
shut-down); Golubski v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 171 Pa. Super.
634, 91 A.2d 315 (1952).
58. See Yobe v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 122 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1954).
59. See American Bridge Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 121 Ind.
App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951); Golubski v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 171 Pa. Super. 634, 91 A.2d 315 (1952).
60. See Glover v. Simmons Co., 31 N.J. Super. 308, 106 A.2d 318, cert.
granted, 16 N.J. 206, 108 A.2d 120 (1954). Contra: Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz.
345, 256 P.2d 721 (1953); Philco v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 175 Pa.
Super. 402, 105 A.2d 176 (1954).
61. See MAss. ANN. LAws c.151A, § 1(r) (2) (1949); WAsH. REV. CODE §
50.20.115 (Supp. 1953).
62. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2366 (78) (8), (1949). The general situation
presents two additional questions: whether the agreement could constitute
a waiver of the ineligible employees' right to compensation in violation of an
applicable non-waiver provision; and whether the expectation of returning
to the same employment takes the situation out of the applicable statutory
definition of "unemployment." See Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951) (agreement held not a waiver);
Glover v. Simmons Co., 31 N.J. Super. 308, 106 A.2d 318, cert. granted, 16 N.J.
206, 108 A.2d 120 (1954) (agreement said to be a waiver if given the effect of
rendering unemployment voluntary); Philco v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 175 Pa. Super. 402, 105 A.2d 176 (1954) (ineligible employees said not
actually unemployed during vacation period); American Bridge Co. v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951); Yobe v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 122 N.E.2d 202 (Ohio 1954) (return to same employ-




express request of the union, even though not required by the terms of
the agreement.
63
Cases in which the immediate separating factor was a relinquish-
ment or a giving up of work demonstrate that the intention to take the
action which will terminate employment, rather than the desire to do
so, is determinative of the question of voluntariness. When a claimant
feels constrained to leave work by circumstances beyond his control,
even though personal to him, his leaving because of these extrinsic
factors could well be considered involuntary from the standpoint of
choice, rather than volition. The argument in favor of such an inter-
pretation has been advanced on the ground that it would eliminate
"harsh" results in states where voluntary leaving will bar the right to
benefits unless it is for a good cause "attributable to the employer,"
'.connected with the work," or involving "fault" on the part of the
employer, by statute or by judicial interpretation.64 But despite
express legislative addition of the word "voluntary" to "leaving," the
general result in the court decisions seems to be that there can be no
leaving which is not voluntary, and the reasons for leaving must be
considered only as causes which may be sufficient to prevent disquali-
fication.
65
Whether personal reasons are good cause for leaving work has been
the subject of much debate concerning the purpose of the voluntary
quit disqualifications and the general policy of unemployment com-
pensation laws.6 6 Although such reasons have been expressly recog-
nized by statute,6 7 many statutes restrict good cause to circumstances
connected with employment, or specify personal reasons which may
not be considered good cause; and in the absence of any restriction
the same result has been reached by interpreting good cause to mean
reasons connected with employment. On the basis of that interpreta-
tion disqualification has been imposed where a wife left work to move
to a city to which her husband had been transferred, 68 a mother left
63. Naylor v. Shuron Optical Co., 281 App. Div. 721, 117 N.Y.S.2d 775 (3d
Dept. 1952), aff'd, Claim of Naylor, 306 N.Y. 794, 118 N.E.2d 816 (1954); Claim
of Rakowski, 276 App. Div. 625, 97 N.Y.S.2d 309 (3d Dep't 1950).
64. See dissenting opinion in State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 SXE.2d 198
(1949); Teple, Disqualification: Discharge For Misconduct and Vountary Quit,
10 OMO ST. L.J. 191, 199 (1949); 52 W. VA. L.Q. 75 (1949).
65. Wolf's v. Iowa Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 244 Iowa 999, 59 N.W.2d 216 (1953);
Sprotts v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 176 Pa. Super. 484, 109 A.2d 212
(1954); State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949). But cf. Fannon v.
Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W.2d 249 (1945) (good cause
attributable to employer).
66. See Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct,
55 YALE L.J. 147, 150-151 (1945); U.S. BuREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
DEP'T OF LABOR, MANUAL OF STATE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LEGISLATION C-57
(1950).
67. See Wis. STAT. § 108.04 (7)i(c) (1949); Western Printing & Lithograph-
ing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 260 Wis. 124, 50 N.W.2d 410 (1951).
68. See Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co. v. Olson, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N.W.
2d 923 (1942); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 219 S.C.
239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951); Note, 13 A.L.R.2d 874 (1950).
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work in order to care for her young children,69 and a woman left
because of pregnancy.70 Statutory restriction to circumstances con-
nected with employment has produced similar decisions,71 and where
domestic circumstances are specifically excluded by statute, these rea-
sons have been found to be within the restriction.7 2 Pennsylvania, in
which a harsh disqualification and an absence of statutory restriction
have produced a more liberal interpretation of "good cause" and
opposite results in this class of cases,73 now has an amendment exclud-
ing "marital, filial and domestic circumstances."7 4
Where statutes require that good cause be "connected" with a
claimant's employment, it has been held that the connection must be
one of cause and effect in cases of ill health.7 5 Where good cause must
be "attributable to the employer," it has been held that a simple causal
connection between conditions of work and ill health is sufficient in
the absence of negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the employer.
76
69. See Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unempl. Comm'n, 204 S.C. 37, 28
S.E.2d 535 (1944).
70. See John Morrel & Co. v. Unemployment Comm'n, 69 S.D. 618, 13 N.W.2d
498 (1944). See Table 28, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAWS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 80, for summary of special availability and
disqualification provisions for pregnancy and marital obligations.
71. See Ex Parte Alabama Textile Products Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 So.2d 303
(1942); Huiet v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 196 Ga. 855, 27 S.E.2d 743 (1943); Talley v.
Unemployment Comp. Div. of Ind. Acc. Bd.. 63 Idaho 644, 124 P.2d 784 (1942);
Moulton v. Iowa Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d 211 (1948);
Nashau Corp. v. Brown, 108 A.2d 52 (N.H. 1954); Meggs v. Texas Unempl.
Comp. Comm'n, 234 'S.W.2d 453 (Texas 1950). But cf. Alabama Mills,
Inc., v. Carnley, 35 Ala. 46, 44 So.2d 622 (1949), cert. denied, 253 Ala. 426, 44
So.2d 627 (1950) (woman who quit work because of pregnancy held not dis-
qualified; decision based upon specifice statutory classification of pregnant
women for purpose of determining eligibility).
72. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Board of Rev. of Dep't of Labor, 413
I1]. 37, 107 N.E.2d 832 (1952),; Neff v. Board of Rev., 117 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1953);
Spotts v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. 176 Pa. Super. 484, 109 A.2d 212
(1954). But cf. Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Review Bd., 119 Ind. App. 191, 84
N.E.2d 895 (1949) (decision based on provision allowing referee or review
board to waive or modify denial of benefits for good cause shown).
73. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 802 (Supp. 1953); Department of Lab. and
Ind. of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,;
164 Pa. Super. 421, 65 A.2d 436 (1949); Mee's Bakery v. Unemployment'
Coip. Bd. of Rev., 162 Pa. Super. 183, 56 A.2d 386 (1948); Department of Lab.
and Ind. of Pennsylvania, Bur. of Empl. and Unempl. Comp. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A.2d 739 (1944); Note, Qualifications
and Disqualifications Under the Pennsylvania Unemployment Law, 26 TEMP.
L.Q. 407 (1953).
74. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 802 (b) (Supp. 1953), Spotts v. Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 176 Pa. Super. 484, 109 A.2d 212 (1954).
75. See Henderson v. Department of Ind. Rel., 252 Ala. 239, 40 So.2d 629
(1949); Wolf's v. Iowa Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 244 Iowa 999, 59 N.W.2d 216
(1953); State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949). Causal connection
was found in Department of Industrial Relations v. Chapmen, 74 So.2d 621
(Ala. 1954); Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Brand, 251 Ala. 643, 38 So.2d 574
(1948). But cf. Amherst Coal Co. v. Hix, 128 W. Va. 119, 35 S.E.2d 773 (1945)
(employer's refusal to transfer miner to place of operations where there was
less dampness held not good cause for miner's leaving work, where statute
provided that "customary working conditions not involving deceit or other
wrongful conduct on the part of the employer" are not sufficient reason for
voluntarily leaving work).




If an individual is not disqualified for refusing employment which
would be injurious to his health,7 7 it would seem that leaving employ-
ment for the same reason should not invoke disqualification no matter
what statutory language is used to require that good cause be found
in circumstances connected with employment. Conversely, it would
seem that a causal connection between conditions of work and ill
health should be required if that factor is deemed to determine
suitability. In Pennsylvania, where there is no statutory restriction,
ill health may be good cause for leaving even though not connected
with employment,78 but the rule is circumscribed by a requirement of
"good faith. ' 79
Reluctance to allow union policy to control distribution of benefits
seems to underlie the holding that mere compliance with a union order
or rule has not been considered good cause for leaving. In New York
it was held that a seaman who quit work after his first voyage because
a union regulation would prevent his taking another must show that
the regulation was "reasonable" in the light of current economic
conditions of the industry or suffer disqualification. 80° Employees who
refuse to cross the picket line of another union on the basis of union
orders have been found disqualified by voluntary leaving.81 But refusal
to cross a belligerent picket line from fear of bodily harm was found
to be a leaving with good cause "attributable to the employer.
'82
In the absence of statutory restriction, ill feeling between a claimant
and another employee, and criticism of claimant's work by another
employee have been found not to be good cause for leaving.83 Where
good cause must be "connected with the work" or "attributable to the
77. IA CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. ff. 1965.
78. Bliley Mfg. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 158 Pa. Super.
570, 45 A.2d 908 (1946). Cf. Wishkoff v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,
169 Pa. Super. 10, 82 A.2d 260 (1951).
79. See Zielinski v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 244,
101 A.2d 419 (1953); Hall v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.. 171 Pa. Super.
127, 90 A.2d 292 (1952). Cf. Hoffstot v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164
Pa. Super. 43, 63 A.2d 355 (1949).
80. See Claim of Fiol, 305 N.Y. 264, 112 N.E.2d 281 (1953), revising 279 App.
Div. 963, 111 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1952). Finding that regulation was rea-
sonable affirmed in Claim of Fiol, 284 App. Div. 519, 132 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1954).
81. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d
707 (1950); Duquesne Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 359 Pa. 535, 59 A.2d 913 (1948); Drylie v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev.. 162 Pa. Super. 211, 56 A.2d 272 (1948); Lexes v. Industrial Commission,
243 P.2d 964 (Utah 1952); accord, Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 163 Pa. Super. 427, 62 A.2d 99 (1948). See Board of Rev.
of West Virginia Dep't of Unempl. Comp. v. Hix. 126 W. Va. 538, 29 S.E.2d 618,
619 (1944). But cf. State, by Davis, v. Ruthbell Coal Co., 56 S.E.2d 549 (W.
Va. 1949).
82. See. Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Co. v. Michigan Unempl. Comp. Comm'n,
324 Mich. 101, 36 N.W.2d 226 (1949). Cf. State, by Davis, v. Ruthbell Coal Co.,
56 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1949).
83. See Green v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 286, 101
A.2d 119 (1953); Wescoe v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 166 Pa. Super,
355, 71 A.2d 837 (1950); Cornell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 164 Pa.
Super. 468, 65 A.2d 259 (1949).
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employment," it has been held that mere dissatisfaction with earnings
or conditions of work does not justify leaving.84 Just as in cases of ill
health, factors which determine suitability of offered employment
should be controlling regardless of the applicable statutory langu-
age. Results reached in cases where a change in conditions of
work or terms of employment were the reasons for leaving seem
consonant with the "suitability" requirements.8 Compensation has
been denied to claimants who left work because of a slight reduction
in wages, 86 increase in duties,87 or change in the physical requirements
of work.M
This summary shows that much of the judicial interpretation of
"voluntary leaving" has been unduly restrictive in its search for
"employer fault" as a basis for relieving the claimant of this disqualifi-
cation. The idea of centering on the reasonableness of the individual's
actions under the circumstances to see whether the policy back of the
disqualification is applicable to him personally has not been dominant
in the reported cases even though well-established in some jurisdic-
tions and undoubtedly reflected in the actual practice of many more.89
C. REFUSAL OF SUITABLE WORK*
The refusal of work disqualification is included in all state statutes,
but most states limit it to "suitable work," thus protecting the worker
against the possible misuse of the threat of disqualification as a means
to compel him to accept employment clearly inimical to his interest
and welfare. Some states require that in order to disqualify the refusal
be without "good cause" and regard this concept as covering reasons
which are personal to the employee and extraneous to the employ-
ment.90 This discussion will consider the three questions which must
be answered in the affirmative before disqualification for refusal to
accept suitable work can logically be arrived at: (1) was employment
offered, (2) was the employment refused, (3) was the employment
suitable?
84. See Department of Ind. Rel. v. Scott, 36 Ala. 184, 53 So.2d 882 (1951);
Wolfe v. Iowa Unempl. Comp. Comm'n, 232 Iowa 1254, 7 N.W.2d 799 (1943).
85. IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. ff 1965 (1951).
86. See Buletza v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 248,
101 A.2d 447 (1953); In re Anderson, 39 Wash.2d 301, 235 P.2d 312 (1951),
accord, Kaylock v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 165 Pa. Super. 376, 67
A.2d 801 (1949).
87. See Muir v. Corsi, 277 App. Div. 1086, 100 N.Y.S.2d 947 (3d Dep't 1950).
88. See Department of Industrial Relations v. Wall, 41 So.2d 611 (Ala. 1949);
Roby v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 74 Idaho 404, 263 P.2d 553 (1953).
89. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, supra note 1 at
69; IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. § 1975, p. 4656.
90. Barclay White Co. v. Board of Rev., 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (1947), 51
DIcK. L. REv. 284 (1947), 59 HARv. L. REV. 1169 (1946), 31 MINN. L. REV.
748 (1947), 95 U. OF PA. L. REV. 686 (1947).
* Acknowledgment is made of the major contribution of Thomas Trimble,
a member of the student staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review, in the research
for and writing of this section.
1955 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
1. Was Employment Offered and Refused? The prospective employer
must make a good faith offer of employment and the time of the
making is important in this connection. An offer made subsequent
to a finding by the referee that no base employer has offered employ-
ment to the claimant, or, following an award, a statement by a base
employer that employment was always open to the claimant, is
treated as an attempt to defeat a claim rather than as a bona fide
desire to retain the services of the claimant. In Brown-Brockmeyer
Co. v. Roach,91 the base employer made its statement of willingness to
hire the employee in a letter to the Board of Review asking for further
appeal. The validity of the offer was denied.
Normally it must be brought to the attention of a claimant that a
specified job opening is being made available to him. In Jackson v.
Review Board92 claimant had been drawing benefits for about two
months, when the employment office called and asked if she was in-
terested in sales work. Her answer was a short "no" and the con-
versation went no further. She was later notified of her disqualifica-
tion for refusal of suitable work. On appeal the Board found the job
was not offered because of her lack of interest and held that her
attitude constituted failure to accept the job. The court reversed the
Board and required that a definite offer be made before disqualification
could be imposed.
•.An offer of work may be communicated by mail. The requirement
as to what information such letter must contain is usually established
by rules of the department administering the program, and includes
items such as job classification, location, rate of pay, and working
hours. It would seem that these technical requirements, established
under a delegated authority from the legislature, should not be made
the basis of producing an unrealistic result. In Glen Alden Coal Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 93 working conditions
were covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the union.
Claimant did not show he was prejudiced by the lack of information
and made no complaint concerning it until after an adverse decision.
The letter was held a valid offer. Where the employer is obligated
under a collective agreement to give notice by mail, to the last known
address of employees temporarily laid off, before being permitted to
regard them as having refused the work, the failure of employee to
notify employer of change in address does not justify employer mailing
notice to the old address when he has any knowledge of the new
address. 94 "Due process" requires a method reasonably calculated to
91. 140 Ohio St. 511, 76 N.E.2d 79 (1947). See Menard, Refusal of Suitable
Work, 55 YALE L.J. 134, 136-37 (1945).
92. 120 NXE.2d 413 (Ind. 1954).
93. 160 Pa. Super. 379, 51 A.2d 518 (1947).
94. Mouldings Div. of Thompson Industries v. Review Bd., 22 Ind. App. 497,
106 N.E.2d 402 (1952).
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give actual notice. The normal requirements would be that actual
notice must be given before a valid offer is made, and to the extent
that this situation conflicts with the requirement, the distinguishing
element lies in the agreement between the parties.
Reason would decree that that which has not been offered cannot be
refused; therefore a valid offer is a prerequisite to a refusal. Condi-
tions can prevail, however, where a claimant may be held to have
refused suitable work in the absence of actual notice of a specific offer.
In Loew's Inc. v. California Employment Stabilization Commission,95
the major movie studios had an agreement with Central Casting Cor-
poration under which the latter hired extra players for the former.
Movie extras were paid $10.50 per day for appearing in groups of fewer
than thirty persons and $5.50 per day for crowd scenes involving more
than thirty persons. A separate telephone was used to hire each group,
and the procedure called for the extras to call these two telephone
numbers each day to apply for work. Claimants had both telephone
numbers, but only called the $10.50 number, and filed an application
for benefits covering the time no $10.50 work was open. The claims
were denied because the $5.50 number was not called, even though
claimant contended there was no definite refusal of any specific offer
of employment at $5.50. Their action, or failure to act, in not calling
the number which they knew should be called was treated as the
equivalent of refusing an offer. In applying for benefits these claimants
stated that work at the $5.50 rate would not be accepted, and the court
said that such answers waived the requirement that a specific offer be
made. The close relationship of this disqualification to the eligibility
requirement of "available for work" may be noted here.
There is no particular source from which the offer must come for a
refusal of it to disqualify. The usual situation probably is a direction
by the employment office to the applicant to apply for a certain job.
The Commissioner may also direct a claimant to return to his cus-
tomary self-employment, though it seems that this is rarely done. It
may be more difficult for the agency to gain a knowledge of offers
coming to a claimant from outside the agency, but if they are for
suitable work, a refusal will still disqualify. The refusal may be direct
in the case of failure to apply or indirect if the behavior of applicant
is calculated to lead to the rejection of his application for employment.
The result is disqualification in either instance.
2. Was the Employment Suitable? Suitability is the vital issue under
this disqualification. The problem will differ with every individual
and every employment, but most legislatures have adopted a standard
list of considerations to serve as guideposts.
95. 76 Cal. App. 231, 172 P.2d 938 (1946); cf. Leclerc v. Administrator, 137
Conn. 438, 78 A.2d 550 (1951).
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"In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an
individual, the commissioner shall consider the degree of risk
involved to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and
prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of
unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his
customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from
his residenc. 6'
The enumerated items are not exclusive, but they include a general
coverage of pertinent considerations. It is not the purpose here to
treat each of these in detail but only to cover some of the highlights
as set forth in recent cases.
a. Health, Physical Fitness and Safety.
Human frailty and individual differences in health and strength
have been given legislative recognition in this program. The purpose,
therefore, is to make the job fit the man rather than insist on the man
fitting the job. No individual will be required to accept employment
which is clearly detrimental to his physical well being. It may, how-
ever, be impossible to know in advance of actual participation
whether the offered work is unsuitable. This presents two classes of
cases, the first involving situations where actual experience has proved
the type of employment to be harmful to the particular claimant. In
Department of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,9 7 a woman was referred to a job on piece work in
which her efforts had to synchronize with those of co-workers. She
refused the employment, and the court held the work was unsuitable
since claimant's nervous condition had caused her to quit such work in
the past. Unless the employer, knowing of claimant's impediment,
claims a special reason why the offered employment will not be detri-
mental, the actual experience of the claimant will relieve him of
testing the job.98 Should the employer minimize the physical exertion
of the job, after claimant refuses it for physical reasons, there must
be a finding in regard to the suitability of the adjusted employment.09
The second class involves questioned cases, in which claimant does not
have actual experience or adequate proof that the offered type of work
will be harmful. Even actual experience falls into this class when
medical treatment has been received and there has been no subsequent
experience to show the treatment was not successful. 100 That several
96. See, e.g., AiA. CODE tit. 26, § 214(e),(1) (1940); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
341.100 (1) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(c),(1) (1950);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.5(c) (1) (Williams 1934).
97. 159 Pa. Super. 571, 49 A.2d 259 (1946),
98. Sledzianowski v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 37,
76 A.2d 666 (1950),.
99. Hess Bros. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 115, 100
A.2d 120 (1953).




years have elapsed since the claimant was last bothered by a physical
condition, which the work might reproduce is not sufficient actual
experience to justify refusal, if there is no real risk of harmful
injury.10 Sometimes by talking to other workers, a person will get
false ideas about working conditions and what will be required of him.
Naturally, where this misapprehension could have been cleared up,
claimant is bound by the conditions as they were and not as he
believed them to be.10 2 In Beecham v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 0 3 an
elderly man refused a job as janitor in the men's room at the plant
because he thought the cigarette smoke there would bother his asth-
matic bronchitis and the work might be too heavy. Disqualification
was imposed because his conclusion was not based on "trial and experi-
ence by appellee at that place or elsewhere."'1 4 In general, if the case
falls within the second class, compensation is denied because the
claimant did not take the job and act thereafter in accordance with
its effect on him. Some courts are more liberal than others, as shown in
Wolfgram v. Employment Security Agency.10 5 The worker, without
checking to see if the job was above or below the ground, refused work
at a mine, because the heat of mine work made him break out in a
rash. Even though he produced no medical evidence at the hearing,
the court refused to affirm the denial of compensation, but rather re-
manded the case for more evidence as to available jobs for claimant
where he would not get the rash.
Fear does not make work unsuitable, if there are no hazards unusual
to the type work involved. Claimant may have an honest fear of
working in a mine, based on injuries to other members of his family,
but this is not a good cause for refusing otherwise suitable work. 06
Women who refuse employment requiring night work because of the
fear of returning home alone in the dark have been held to have re-
fused suitable work without good cause.
0 7
b. Morals.
As declared in the public policy and purpose sections of the state
statutes, economic insecurity due to unemployment is regarded as a
danger to the morals of a community and its individual members. The
degree of risk to claimant's morals can be expected then to aid in the
determination of suitability. Only one recent reported court decision
has involved the question of degree of risk to claimant's morals, and
101. Suska v. Board of Rev., 166 Pa. Super. 293, 70 A.2d 397 (1950).
102. Broadway v. Bolar, 33 Ala. App. 57, 29 So.2d 687 (1947).
103. 150 Neb. 792, 36 N.W.2d 233 (1949).
104. 36 id. at 236 (1949).
105. 272 P.2d 699 (Idaho 1954).
106. Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Board of Rev., 171 Pa. Super. 325, 90 A.2d 331
(1952), 14 U. ov PrrT. L. REy. 454 (1953).
107. Beall v. Bureau of Unempl. Comp., 101 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio App. 1951);
Azzato v. Board of Rev., 172 Pa. Super. 417, 94 A.2d 178 (1953).
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in that one a rather well settled rule of law was litigated. Nearly all
states have allowed benefits where employment was refused because
it required Sabbath work, whether the individual observed Saturday 08
or Sunday.109 Ohio added the standard suitability clause of degree of
risk to claimant's health, safety and morals in 1949. Prior to that
amendment the "Ohio Supreme Court had held that Saturday work
(on claimant's Sabbath) was suitable.110 In Tary v. Board of Review,
the court said,
"The test of an individual's morals is subjective, and . . . is dependent
upon his conscientious beliefs. The precepts of a religion in which one
believes are an integral and essential part of one's morals,"111
as it lined Ohio up with the prevailing pattern by awarding compensa-
tion to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday.
c. Prior Earnings and Wages in Similar Work.
The unemployment insurance program is designed to protect rather
than depress unduly the present social status and standard of living
of the claimant. Since these may be achieved by, and are undoubtedly
related to, his level of earnings, offered employment may be unsuitable
because of low wages. However, it has been held that a claimant will
not be heard to assert this later when he refused to investigate a job
opening in the first instance. The rationale given is that had he investi-
gated and made known his qualifications and experience, a satisfactory
wage might have been offered." 2 If the employment offered is piece
work and claimant is doubtful of how much he can earn, he may be
required to try the job and find out."
3
Suitability in terms of wages is not always determined by the
amount of money involved, for a sufficient lapse of time will cause un-
suitable wages to become suitable." 4 Following the conclusion of World
War II many persons lost relatively higher paying defense jobs, and
were reluctant to return to their lower paying peacetime employment.
A high paid worker obviously should be given some time to seek an-
other job at the level he has achieved before being disqualified for
108. 5 BEN. SER. No. 10, 7643-Calif. A (1942); 10 BEN. SER. No. 4, 11372-D.C.
A (1946); 9 BEN. SER. No. 3, 10325-Ill. R (1945); 6 BEN. SER. No. 11, 8244-Mich.
A (1943); 9 BEN. SER. No. 1, 10197-N.Y. A (1945). Contra: 7 BEN. SEr. No. 2,
8362-Mass. A (1943).
109. 4 BEN. SER. No. 12, 6765-D.C. A (1941),; 5 BEN. SER. No. 2, 7054-Ga. R
(1941); 10 BEN. SER. No. 5, 11459-Ind. A (1946); 7 BEN. SEE. No. 12, 9007-N.C.
A (1944).
110. Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643
(1946), 24 Cm-KENT REV. 281 (1946).
111. 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1954), 30 NOTa DAME LAW. 176
(1954), 8 VAND. L. REV. 519 (1955).
112. Richardson v. Administrator, 28 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1946).
113. Elnit v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 168 Pa. Super. 158, 77 A.2d
668 (1951).
114. Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886 (1946).
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refusal to accept lower wages. While this period can be said to be for
a reasonable period of time, the problem of drawing the line still
remains. Three days,115 or five days 1 6 are clearly insufficient, and
nineteen days" 7 has been held an unreasonably short time in which to
be required to find suitable work. One board regarded one month as
the reasonable time in which to find a similar paying job.118 Suitability
involves whether the pay is substantially less than previously received,
but "suitability is not a rigid fixation"" 9 and consideration must be
given to length of unemployment and the prospects of securing accus-
tomed work.
In Hallahan v. Riley,120 claimant's former occupation of mending was
skilled work paying $1.04 per hour, but after a ten-week period of
unemployment, the unskilled job of burling paying $0.60 per hour,
which claimant had justifiably refused earlier, was deemed suitable
work. Ten months would clearly be long enough.121 In 1951, one court
was ready to restrict this reasonable time rule because it was thought
to be based upon different economic conditions, and the reconversion
period had ended. Claimant worked as a miners' laborer for fourteen
months before getting a job welding for a shipbuilding firm at $75 to
$100 per week. This job lasted only eleven months, at which time
the base employer offered claimant his old job b'ack at. $12.40 a day.
He refused, and the board held the offered work to be unsuitable
because claimant was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to find work
at a rate of pay commensurate with his last employment. The court
reversed, reasoning that the offered work having been suitable for
fourteen months prior to the welding job, it was still suitable.12 An-
other case refused to apply the reasonable-time rule when the
applicant had a high demonstrated earning capacity but was only
temporarily laid off and expected to return to that wage shortly. He
refused proffered employment with his base year employer because
the wages were not commensurate with those of his last employment.
The reason behind the rule, i.e. ample time to seek employment at a
rate commensurate with demonstrated earning capacity, was said not
to exist when claimant was marking time until recall and to apply it
115. Pacific Mills v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 322 Mass. 362, 77 N.E.2d
413 (1948).
116. American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 159 Pa.
Super. 74, 46 A.2d 512 (1946).
117. American Bridge Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 159 Pa.
Super. 74, 46 A.2d 510 (1946).
118. Ibid.
119. Pacific Mills v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 322 Mass. 362, 77 N.E.2d
413,416 (1948).
120. 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886 (1946).
121. Haug v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 162 Pa. Super. 1, 56 A.2d
396 (1948).
122. Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 169 Pa.
Super. 356, 82 A.2d 64 (1951).
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would only extend "an invitation to a compensated rest.'
2 3
The prevailing wage for similar work in the same locality may be
considered in determining suitability, and the applicant will not be
required to accept substantially less favorable wage conditions.
Offered wages are in this instance compared with those received by
other workers rather than with the prior wages earned by the in-
dividual. This test is embodied in the "labor standards provision"
required for federal approval of the state law, which will be discussed
later. It may be noted that this test appears to be more restrictive than
the "prior earnings" test.124
Comparison of earnings is not limited to wage rates per hour be-
tween offered work and prior or similar work. Consideration may be
given to economic advantage in whatever form it may exist, in "fringe
benefits" and working conditions, such as longer working hours (with
greater income), steady work, sick benefits and vacation with pay.=
The following cases are examples of wage disparity nonetheless held to
be suitable. A carpenter previously earning the union scale of $1.58
an hour refused employment at $1.02 to $1.20 an hour in an "open
shop" without "good cause."'2 6 An employer offered suitable new work
at $1.05 per hour to an employer previously earning $1.17 per hour,
who was forced to change jobs due to a dermatitis condition.127 A
stenographer was denied compensation when she refused $48.50 for a
five day week job and her previous salary was $216 a month.128
d. Location, Transportation and Distance.
This consideration of suitability expresses a social standard of
worker mobility, and its practical effect is to tell the worker how
much commuting he must do. 2 9 An unreasonable distance between
claimant and the offered employment renders it unsuitable, but the
individual is not normally allowed to rely on distance created by him-
self. When a person regularly employed removes himself to a point
where work is unavailable, while his former employment is continu-
ously available, he has been held to waive his right to compensation as
against an employer offering such employment. This result is reached
123. Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 169 Pa.
Super. 124, 82 A.2d 74, 76 (1951).
124. Industrial Comm'n v. Brady, 128 Colo. 490, 263 P.2d 578 (1953); Konter
v. Unemployment Bd. of Rev., 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611 (1947).
125. Bigger v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 4 Terry 553, 53 A.2d 761
(Del. 1947).
126. See note 89 supra.
127. Maryland Empl. Sec. Bd. v. Berry, 195 Md. 459, 73 A.2d 894 (1950).
128. Boyland v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 164, 100
A.2d 129 (1953).
129. ALTMAK, AvAILABILITY FOR WORK 212 (1950). "Since such decisions are
enmeshed in basic social policies of mobility and freedom, they need a solid
base of information on travel times, distances, and costs for workers. This
should be obtained on a local basis. In general, it is now lacking." Id. at 213.
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by comparing the distance from the former residence to the work
rather than from the new residence to the work.130 Such a rationale
seems to accord no necessary weight to the reasonableness of the cir-
cumstances under which the employee left nor to the reasonableness
of requiring him to return. It seems to represent a mechanical ap-
proach designed to protect the favorable experience of the particular
employer, and disregard the values inherent in free mobility of labor.
The application of the voluntary quit disqualification would appear to
preserve the proper balance in values, giving due weight to- the cir-
cumstances of his leaving employment or employment opportunities
in the first location. An applicant is required to accept offered employ-
ment in the same labor market as his residence even though in a differ-
ent town, the labor area being the criterion.' 3' Furthermore, an
unsuitable distance probably becomes suitable thereafter, once claim-
ant has worked at the location, so that a later refusal based on distance
is of questionable merit.132 Likewise, a loss of transportation may fail
to make the distance unreasonable where transportation previously
existed.133 This type case arises when a person resides in a non-
industrial village while working in an industrial city.
e. Skill and Training.
The development and preservation of worker skills and the advance-
ment and utilization of employee training is of general public concern
in time of peace as well as war. The unemployment insurance program
should be administered, therefore, so as to further these same objec-
tives. The considerations here are very similar to those regarding
wages, and the two standards are often treated together since lower
skills usually result in lower wages. 134 Attention is given to the expect-
ancy of securing employment of the grade for which the worker's
capacity fits him, and to the length of unemployment, because work
unsuitable at the beginning may be deemed suitable after a lapse of
time. In Pacific Mills v. Director of Division of Employment Se-
curity,13 5 the claimant had been trained for office work at a business
college. She held a clerical job at Pacific Mills about two years before
being laid off because of lack of work. She refused work in a shipping
department stapling tags to pieces of cloth piled on trucks and record-
ing yardage on an adding machine, even though the pay was about the
130. Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Trowbridge, 120 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio App.
1951) Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Holmes, 152 Ohio St. 411, 89 N.E.2d 580
(19495.
131. Hanna v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 172 Pa. Super. 417, 94
A.2d 178 (1953).
132. Konter v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d
611 (1947).
133. Ibid.
134. Hallahan v. Riley. 94 N.H. 48, 45 A.2d 886 (1946).
135. 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413 (1948).
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same as her prior wages. There was no disqualification because it was
considered unreasonable to force a skilled office worker to accept work
below her best skill at the beginning of a period of unemployment.
f. Temporary Work and Personal Reasons
Employment will not be regarded as unsuitable because it is tem-
porary, and the fact that the employer cannot predict in advance how
long work will be available does not give the applicant a good cause
for refusing.1' Personal desires concerning working conditions, such
as the size of the office or the number of fellow workers, offer no
"necessitous and compelling reason"'137 for refusal of work. Further,
the personal desire to retain the benefits of a union contract is thought
not to make a job unsuitable. In Lidwigsen v. Board of Review,13 the
Curtiss-Wright Corporation had a plant cafeteria whose employees
had been under the same union contract as the production workers.
The corporation arranged to turn the cafeteria over to an independent
catering contractor, but all cafeteria employees were offered their
same job at the same wage. This offer was refused and production
jobs were requested so that they would remain under the union con-
tract. These employees were later given production jobs because of
the union demand. Claimant filed for compensation during the period
of unemployment in between the jobs and the court held he had re-
fused suitable work.
g. The Labor Standards Provision.
The previously discussed provisions, alone, do not present the full
picture as to what is suitable work. As a condition for approval of a
state law for tax offset purposes the following provision now adopted
by all states is required.
"Compensation shall not be denied ... to any otherwise eligible in-
dividual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following
conditions: (A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike,
lockout, or other labor dispute; (B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions
of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than
those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (C). if as a condition of
being employed the individual would be required to join a company union
or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organiza-
tion." 139
It should be noted that these factors render "new work" unsuitable
136. Barr v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 172 Pa. Super. 389, 93 A.2d
877 (1953).
137. Boyland v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 174 Pa. Super. 164, 100
A.2d 129, 130 (1953); Corrado v. Director of Div. of Empl. Sec., 325 Mass. 711,
92 N.E.2d 379 (1950).
138. 12 N.J. 64, 95 A.2d 707 (1953).
139. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a)'(5) (1948).
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under the circumstances stated, and the previously discussed factors
will thus vary from one individual to another. These factors are
purely negative in character in that they exclude work in conflict with
them, but the absence of such conflict does not necessarily mean that
such work is suitable. The Secretary of Labor ruled on December 19,
1949, inter alia, that refusal of work which does not meet the above
standard may not serve as a basis for deciding whether an individual
is "otherwise eligible;' 40 these standards, therefore, are a basic
minimum which all "new work" must meet. These provisions are in-
cluded here because of their obvious relevancy but no attempt is made
to treat them in detail.' 4 ' The reasons behind the three provisions
would seem to be obvious. Under clause (A) the unemployment insur-
ance program is to maintain neutrality in a labor dispute. A claimant
can refuse to be a strikebreaker and not be disqualified. Clause (B)
guards against using the program to undermine and depress prevailing
labor standards. Clause (C) relates to two problems which were of
greater significance when the program was being developed in the
early 1930's than they are today, namely, the company-dominated union
and the "yellow dog" contract, both of which are of course the subject
of affirmative condemnation under the National Labor Relations Act.'4
The states not only must include these standards in their statutes,
but must also give them an appropriate interpretation. The Secretary
of Labor has said, "To make these provisions in the Federal Act mean-
ingful, the State law must be given the same meaning in actual con-
struction and application as the Federal law."'143
D. DISCHARGE FOR MISCONDUCT
The statutes of every state impose disqualification for benefits upon
the claimant discharged for misconduct, 44 and there is a tendency to
vary the disqualifying period and to reduce or cancel benefit credits
"according to the seriousness of the misconduct.' 1 45 A substantial
minority of states provide still heavier disqualification (including can-
cellation of benefit credits) for aggravated or gross misconduct.
146
Some states specify "wilful misconduct" or "deliberate misconduct
in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest" in their statutory
language. 147 A majority reach a similar result by administrative or
140. IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. § 1965.
141. See deVyver, Federal Standards in Unemployment Insurance, infra.
p. 411.
142. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-197, specifically §§ 8 (a) (1) and
8 (a) (2) of NLRA.
143. IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. ff 1965.
144. See Table 25 in COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
LAWS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72; and Kempfer, supra note 17, at 160-66; Teple,
supra note 17, at 191, 195-98; IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 1 1970.
145. COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 71.
146. Id. at 73.
147. Id. at 71.
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judicial interpretation of the term "misconduct connected with the
work.' 148 It seems to be well established that the disqualifying state of
mind required is that associated, in the industrial sense, with inten-
tional wrongdoing or gross neglect, rather than a simple negligence
alone. An elaboration of this distinction is contained in the leading
case of Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court declared:
"If mere mistakes, errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion,
minor and but casual or unintentional carelessness or negligence, and
similar minor peccadilloes must be considered to be within the term
'misconduct', and no such element as wantonness, culpability or wilfulness
with wrongful intent or evil design is to be included as an essential element
in order to constitute misconduct within the intended meaning of the term
as used in the statute, then there will be defeated, as to many of the great
mass of less capable industrial workers ... for whose benefit the act was
largely designed, the principal purpose and object under the act .... [Ilt is
necessary and proper to resort to the rule that statutes providing for
forfeitures are to be strictly construed and terms and provisions therein,
which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning will be give the construction
which is least favorable to working a forfeiture, so as to minimize the penal
character of the provision by excluding rather than including conduct or
cases not clearly intended to be within the provision .... The application
of these principles leads to the conclusion ... that the intended meaning
of the term 'misconduct' . . . is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or
wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate viola-
tions or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the
right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such
degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or
evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the
employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his em-
ployer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure
in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies
or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors of judg-
ment or discretion are not to be deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning
of the statute."149
The above quotation has been set out at length not only because it
continues to be more widely cited with approval in jurisdictions
throughout the country than any other exposition of the term,150 but
because its, in some degree repetitive, character gives an emphasis
and establishes a "climate of opinion" which is considered of inde-
pendent importance in judging the weight of the various phrases and
clauses. It seems clear that we are not looking simply for substandard
148. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941); Mandes
v. Employment Sec. Agency, 74 Idaho 23, 255 P.2d 1049 (1953); Winer Inc. v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 120 Ind. App. 638, 95 N.E.2d 214 (1950);
State ex tel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Smith, 235 N.C. 104, 69 S.E.2d 32
(1952); cf. Morgan v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 176 Pa. Super. 297,
106 A.2d 618 (1954) (the Pennsylvania statute specifies "wilful" misconduct).
149. 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941).
150. See Mandes v. Employment Sec. Agency, and Winer, Inc. v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., supra note 148.
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conduct under this disqualification but for a wilful or wanton state of
mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct. It may be
pointed out that an employee could scarcely have the state of mind
requisite for "misconduct" under the Boynton language and not foresee
the termination or suspension of his employment as a reasonable and
probable consequence of engaging in the conduct.
Turning from the requisite state of mind to the type of act or failure
to act necessary for "misconduct," we are necessarily thrown into a
shifting framework of reference. The wrongdoing or impropriety here
may involve legal wrong, but this is comparatively rare and is of little
help in determining the boundaries of the term.'5 ' Since we can have
no general guide in the laws of the land, the "wrongness" of the conduct
must be judged in the particular employment context.152 Identical
conduct might be treated as an "intentional and substantial disregard
of the employer's interest" in one environment and not in another.
One plant will have established rules for employee conduct which will
not exist at another work location. It is not just a matter of formulat-
ing rules and communicating them to employees, however. Even where
rules for employee conduct have been posted, their lack of enforcement
or their enforcement on a sporadic or discriminatory basis will not
provide a basis for disqualification in a subsequent case.15 3 On the
other hand, certain conduct will be so flagrant that indulging in it will
undoubtedly be "misconduct" whether or not a specific rule prohibiting
it has been expressly formulated and posted or otherwise announced
to the employees.
154
Courts, as in the Boynton CabI55 case, speak of "disregard of the em-
ployer's interest" or disregard of the employee's "obligation to his
employer." Those interests and obligations can be made concrete,
however, only in terms of the "industrial law," the "going" standard
of conduct, established and maintained, in fact, for the particular plant,
warehouse, store, or office. This "industrial law" may largely result
from the unilateral determination of the employer. If there is a col-
lective bargaining agency present, this "industrial law" will be con-
ditioned, impliedly, and perhaps expressly, by that fact.15 It can be
151. IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. ff 1970, p. 4649.
152. Id. at 4651.
153. Id. at 4652.
154. See e.g., Doran v. Employment Sec. Agency, 267 P.2d 628 (Idaho 1954);
and Merkle v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 120 Ind. App. 108, 90 N.E.2d
524 (1950), which make no reference to the existence or publication of rules
governing the particular conduct. It is believed that this situation would pre-
vail in the majority of court decisions imposing disqualification for a miscon-
duct discharge.
155. 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941).
156. Collective bargaining will be concerned with "terms and conditions
of employment." See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT § 8(d), 61 STAT. 140,
29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (Supp. 1954). This will obviously cover most, if not all, of
the rules governing employee conduct which could result in suspension or
discharge. This in turn is conditioned by the undefined boundaries of "man-
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noted that lhe individual coming into certain employment may be, and
frequently is, given express information and instruction regarding the
established standard of conduct in that employment. Practice and
custom in the employment may reinforce, dilute or override what is
expressly stated,157 although it is always possible for the rule-making
authority to change the going standard of required conduct if adequate
not-ice is afforded those affected.15 8 The rules of conduct required by
the employer must be "reasonable" if their violation is to be disqualify-
ing "misconduct" under the unemployment insurance program. We do
have a legislative standard in the sense that effect will not be given
to the unreasonable requirements of the employer.159
General understanding and custom in the particular plant or in-
dustry or in employment generally can supply a standard where none
has been expressly stated. This results in the crystallization of certain
patterns of conduct as the equivalent of statutory "misconduct" in
spite of the flexibility and case-by-case approach suggested in the
preceding paragraphs. 160 Intoxication during working hours,161 dis-
honesty, 62 excessive absenteeism, 63 insubordination, 6 4 refusal to per-
form assigned work' 65 -most of the reported court decisions imposing
disqualification (and probably the bulk of administrative determina-
tions as well) will come under one or more of these headings.166 In-
stances of inability or incapacity to perform the work on the other
hand, or simple negligence recur frequently among the decisions
finding absence of disqualification. 1
67
The "connected with the work" aspect of misconduct normally
results in disregard of the employee's conduct away from the working
premises or while he is not in the course of his employment even
agement prerogative." See HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING
TABLE 56-138 (1945), particularly 99-104 dealing with disciplinary rules.
157. IA CCH, UNEMPL. INS. REP. I 1970, p. 4652.
158. See Krawczyk v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 175 Pa. Super. 361,
104 A.2d 338 (1954).
159. IA CCH, UNEMPL. INS. REP. 11 1970 p. 4652; and see Kempfer, supra note
17, at 164-66.
160. IA CCH, UNEMPI. INS. REP. ff 1970, pp. 4654-55.
161. Id. at 4654; see Teple, supra note 17, at 196; cf. Doran v. Employment
Sec. Agency, 267 P.2d 628 (Idaho 1954).
162. IA CCH, UNEMPL. INS. REP. § 1970, p. 4655.
163. Doran v. Employment Sec. Agency, 267 P.2d 628 (Idaho 1954); Merkle v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 120 Ind. App. 108, 90 N.E.2d 524 (1950).
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though he is discharged for such conduct. 68 However, it is recognized
that the interests of the employer may nevertheless be adversely
affected by such conduct and, at times, the disqualifying relationship
to the employment is found by a sort of "House-that-Jack-built" type
of reasoning. 69 The more usual approach is not to indulge in a search
for any such tenuous connection. 70
A final word may be said about the necessity for the alleged miscon-
duct (assuming it has been proven) being the actual motivating factor
in the discharge. If the discharge (or suspension) was for sorhe other
motive, the disqualification is inappropriate even though the conduct
amounts to "misconduct."' 7' This is another reason for the basic neces-
sity of viewing the full circumstances of the particular case against
the background of the "going" standard of industrial conduct in the
particular employment. This will permit evaluation of the extent to
which the claimant has fallen below that standard and whether or not
his discharge or suspension is motivated by his falling below such
standard or some other reasons. It will also avoid the too ready
"pigeon-holing" of fact situations and permit an informed judgment
as to whether the employee could reasonably have foreseen a termi-
nation or suspension of his employment as a result of engaging in the
particular conduct.
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171. See IA CCH UNEMPL. INS. REF. ff 1970, pp. 4649-50; Kempfer, supra note
17, at 161.
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